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The Economic Impact of Immigration in Greece: 
Taking Stock of the Existing Evidence
*
 
Greece was traditionally an emigration country. However, since the early 1990s it became an 
immigrant destination and nowadays up to a tenth of the population are immigrants, mainly 
from neighbouring Balkan countries and, especially, Albania. This large scale immigration 
within a short time period had important social, as well as, economic consequences. The 
paper reviews the existing evidence and concludes that on average the economic effects of 
immigration were beneficial, although their distributional consequences were adverse. Greek 
immigration policy was haphazard and more efforts are needed in order to integrate the 
immigrants in the economic and social fabric of the country. 
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1. Introduction 
Migration is considered by many social scientists as one of the most important 
phenomena  of  our  time.  Apart  from  the  direct  consequences  on  the  size  and 
structure of a country’s population, both for the origin and the host country, there 
are numerous other effects of migration, either positive or negative, in the short-run 
or in the long-run, that need to be carefully investigated. For example, migration 
flows seem to affect directly each economy’s output and unemployment rate, while 
they have more complex impacts on growth rates, trade relations and balance of 
payments, the demand for education, health services and social infrastructure, as 
well as, on the political, social and cultural conditions of both countries.  
Ever since the creation of the modern Greek state in 1830 – in fact, far earlier than 
that – Greece was an emigration country. Initially, the destination of the immigrants 
were  mainly  the  lands  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries as well as Egypt, in the first half of the twentieth century USA and after 
World War II Western Europe (principally West Germany) and Australia.  This came 
to  a  halt  with  the  first  oil  crisis.  Between  the  mid-1970s  and  the  late  1980s  net 
migration  was  close  to  zero  (Lianos,  1975;  Venturini,  2004).  The  collapse  of  the 
communist  regimes  at  the  end  of  the  1980s  caused  an  unprecedented  influx  of 
economic  immigrants  coming  mainly  from  the  former  communist  countries  of 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Like other Southern European countries (Italy. 
Spain, Portugal), large numbers of immigrants arrived in Greece in a short period of 
time.1 Despite the fact that these countries have certain similarities (large informal 
sectors, low labour force participation rates, large agricultural and labour intensive 
sectors  and  ageing  populations)  that  tend  to  favour  the  illegal  or  semi-illegal 
employment  of  immigrants,  their  experiences  are  very  different.  For  example, 
Greece’s  immigrants  come  predominantly  from  one  country  (Albania)  and  are 
usually  unskilled.  In  addition,  their  share  in  the  total  population  is  substantially 
higher  than  in  the  other  Southern  European  countries,  most  of  them  entered  the 
country illegally and, last but not least, the Greek perception of ethnicity seems to be 
a  serious  drawback  in  the  immigrants’  integration  process  (Cavounidis  (2002a); 
Baldwin-Edwards, 2004a). 
                                                 
1   The experiences of these three South-European countries are considered similar. For a 
general discussion of migration in southern Europe see Venturini (2004).   2 
The  fact  that  Greece  has  always  been  a  migrant  exporting  country  and  has 
suddenly  become  a  migrant  importing  country  caught  the  government  and  the 
society, on the whole, off guard and raised a number of issues that ranged from 
dealing with xenophobia and racism to the formation of a proper migration policy. 
These issues have been investigated to some extend, some more than others, but the 
lack of appropriate statistical information poses serious problems. The purpose of 
this paper is to survey the existing literature on migration in Greece, by focusing on 
the economic effects of immigration.  
 
2. A Brief History of Migration in Greece 
Although, as noted above emigration was a salient feature of the modern Greek 
state, two major waves of mass emigration can be traced. The first goes back to the 
end  of  the  19th  and  the  beginning  of  the  20th  century.  It  was  triggered  by  the 
economic  crisis  of  1893  that  followed  the  drastic  fall  in  the  price  of  currants 
internationally (currants being the main export commodity of Greece at that time). It 
is estimated that during the period 1890-1914 almost a sixth of Greece’s population 
emigrated  to  the  United  States  and  Egypt  (Kassimis  &  Kassimi,  2004).  Greek 
authorities encouraged emigration as a means of improving the balance of payments 
of the local economy through remittances. 
The second emigration wave began a little after the end of World War II and 
lasted for almost twenty years, from the beginning of the 1950s up until the mid 
1970s. The economic and political situation in Greece is usually considered to have 
played an important role in driving this second emigration wave. During that time 
Greece was a sender of migrants to the United States, Australia, Canada and many 
Western  European  countries  (mainly  West  Germany,  Belgium  and  Sweden).  It  is 
estimated that approximately 1.2 million people left Greece. Many of them returned 
to Greece. For example, between 1968 and 1974, 392 thousand persons left Greece, 
while 159 thousand persons returned (Lianos, 1975 and 1980).  
The oil crises of 1973 and 1980 caused economic instability in the host countries 
and led to the reduction of demand for foreign labour. As a result, the industrialised 
countries  of  Northern  Europe  introduced  more  restrictive  immigration  policies. 
Immigrants, including Greek immigrant, were encouraged to return to their home   3 
countries,  while  others  were  discouraged  from  leaving  their  countries.  Especially 
after  1974,  when  democracy  was  re-established  in  Greece  following  a  period  of 
military  junta  rule  (1967-1974),  the  inflow  of  repatriating  immigrants  started  to 
outnumber the outflow of emigrants. As a result, it is estimated, that between 1975 
and 1977, 82 thousand people emigrated as opposed to 103 thousand people, who 
returned to Greece (Lianos, 1980; Katseli & Glytsos, 1989). At the same time, flows in 
the opposite direction started to emerge. For example, in 1972, the Greek consulate in 
Cairo handed out 10,000 visas to Egyptian workers acting on the concern for labour 
shortages expressed by the Greek Federation of Industry (SEV) (Koniordos, 1994). 
Since  then,  the  number  of  regular  immigrants  to  Greece  continued  to  rise. 
Unfortunately, the National Statistical Service of Greece stopped collecting data on 
migration flows in 1977, but according to data collected by the Ministry of Labour, 
there were 28,628 legally employed immigrants in Greece in 1980, 28,422 in 1990 and 
33,912 in 1992 (Kirpianos et al, 2003).  
The immigration flows changed drastically since the second half of the 1980s, 
when Greece encountered an inflow of immigrants from countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe resulting from the communist regimes’ liberalisation process. The 
first  migrants  came  from  Poland  and  were  quickly  succeeded  by  Bulgarians  and 
Romanians. A rising flow of immigrants followed the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the former communist countries at the end of the 1980s. The inflow of migrants 
reached its peak at the beginning of the 1990s, when Albanians started moving into 
Greece. Although many immigrants were of Greek descent (Pontic Greeks from the 
former Soviet Union and Greek Albanians) and were entitled to special residence 
and employment status, for the vast majority of immigrants this was not the case. As 
a result, by the mid 1990s Greece was characterised by large numbers of immigrants, 
often without the necessary documents (“undocumented” or “illegal”) (Cavounidis, 
2002a). 
The  sudden  inflow  of  immigrants  found  Greece  completely  unprepared  and 
caused haphazard attempts from the government’s side to form a proper migration 
policy. Law 1975/1991 entitled “Entry, exit, sojourn, employment, removal of aliens, 
procedure for the recognition of refugees and other measures” aimed primarily at 
restricting immigration and facilitating the removal of illegal immigrants and other 
foreigners  temporarily  residing  in  Greece.  With  a  considerable  delay,  Greece   4 
implemented the first regularisation program in 19982, following the issuance of two 
presidential decrees, which were implemented in two successive stages. In the first 
stage, a “Temporary Residence Permit Card” was issued, known as the “white card”, 
while the second stage involved the issuance of a limited duration residence card, 
known as the “green card”. In order to be eligible to apply for the “green card”, an 
immigrant ought to prove that he/she was legally employed for a minimum of forty 
days since January 1st 1998, which is usually considered a decisive factor affecting the 
program’s  success  (Cavounidis,  2002a  and  2002b).  The  second  regularisation 
program was introduced -before the completion of the first one- by law 2910/2001 
entitled “Entry and sojourn of foreigners in the Greek territory, naturalisation and 
other measures” in 2001 aiming primarily at attracting those who did not participate 
in the first one. Due to the fact that the permit was initially issued for only one year, 
thus causing serious problems to both the authorities and the immigrants who were 
incurring costs in terms of money and time, the process was revised in January 2004 
(Act 3202/2003) to provide for a two-year permit and, thus, facilitate the procedure. 
The next step was a three year action plan introduced in 2001 entitled “Action 
Plan  for  the  Social  Integration  of  Immigrants  (for  the  period  2002-2005)”,  which 
included measures attempting to help immigrants’ integration into the Greek labour 
market, ensure their access to health services, promote cultural interaction and fight 
xenophobia and racism within the Greek society, but it was outshined by the 2004 
Olympic Games. The most recent attempt to deal with immigration took place in 
August 2005, when a new immigration law (3386/2005) was approved by the Greek 
Parliament entitled “Entry, stay and integration of third country nationals in Greece” 
(Triandafyllidou, 2005). Critics of this bill point out that it continued to ignore almost 
70%  of  undocumented  immigrants  in  Greece  by  not  allowing  them  to  obtain 
residence permits (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2005a). On the other hand, one must 
accept the fact that the repetitive nature of the regularisation processes indicated a 
more  pragmatic  approach  adopted  by  the  authorities  towards  immigration. 
Furthermore,  it  helped  the  majority  of  immigrants  to  ensure  a  certain  degree  of 
dignity within the Greek society and facilitated many practical aspects of their lives 
in Greece (Hatziprokopiou, 2005). 
                                                 
2   By  the  time  Greece  implemented  its  first  regularisation  program,  Italy  was 
undertaking its fourth program, while Spain had already implemented three programs and 
Portugal two (OECD, 1999a).   5 
In  general,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  Greek  migration  policy,  through  the 
aforementioned pieces of legislation, seems to lack social justification in the sense 
that  it  does  not  provide  for  the  actual  integration  of  immigrants  into  the  Greek 
society (social security and social and human rights).3 Nevertheless, the initiatives of 
non-state actors, such as community associations, left-wing parties, NGOs, antiracist 
groups, trade unions, the church etc. have partly substituted for the paucity of state’s 
actions  aiming  at  supporting  immigrants  and  protecting  their  rights 
(Hatziprokopiou,  2005).  A  considerable  proportion  of  immigrants  are  still  not 
entitled to social security benefits, they are not eligible for unemployment benefits, 
their  wages  are  lower,  sometimes  considerably  so,  in  comparison  with  those 
determined by collective bargaining and they face difficulties in family reunification 
(Robolis, 2005; Kapsalis, 2005; Kapsalis & Linardos-Rylmon, 2005). Hence, the main 
challenge facing Greek migration policy is twofold; first, how to effectively control 
migrant inflows and, second, to prevent legal immigrants from lapsing into illegality 
and help promote their economic and social integration4 (Fakiolas, 2003; Simopoulos, 
2005). 
 
3. A profile of the immigrant population 
There are few data sets providing reliable quantitative information for the 
empirical study of aspects of immigration in Greece and they are mainly collected by 
state agencies, such as the National Statistical Service of Greece (ESYE), the Ministry 
of Labour, the Ministry of Education and Religion Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,  the  Ministry  of  Public  Order,  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  and  the 
Institution for Social Security (IKA). The first nationwide dataset came from the first 
                                                 
3   Further, it should be noted that Greece signed a number of bilateral agreements with 
neighbouring countries aiming at controlling illegal immigration and regulating the Greek 
labour market by focusing on seasonal employment. At the beginning of the 1990s such an 
agreement was signed with Albania in order to issue 30,000 seasonal work permits. In 1995 a 
cooperation treaty with Bulgaria was signed, which provided for three-month work permits 
for Bulgarian citizens who wished to work in Greece. Finally, in May 1996 a treaty was signed 
with Albania, which was validated by Law 2482/1997 and was setting the rules for accepting 
seasonal workers from Albania to Greece (Bagavos & Papadopoulou, 2002). 
4   Education policies aimed at promoting immigrants’ integration are not discussed in 
detail  here.  Nevertheless,  such  policies  are  clearly  very  important  in  the  long  run  since 
education plays a crucial role, on the one hand, in determining identity formation, national 
cohesion and national consciousness and, on the other hand, in determining access to the 
labour  market,  personal  and  economic  development.  For  a  thorough  discussion  of  Greek 
education policies regarding immigrants, see Triandafyllidou & Gropas (2007).    6 
regularisation program of 1998, while a more recent one is the 2001 Census carried 
out by ESYE. Other datasets include micro-data from the Labour Force Surveys by 
ESYE, unpublished data from the Labour Force Employment Organisation (OAED) 
and a survey conducted by the General Secretariat of Emigrant Greeks (GSEG) in 
2000. The most recent source of information is the 2004/5 Household Budget Survey 
(HBS)  carried  out  by  ESYE.  Furthermore,  some  researchers  have  resorted  to 
collecting data themselves, by conducting their own surveys, limited to small non-
random  samples  (often  less  than  150  observations).  Undoubtedly,  their  results 
should be interpreted with utmost caution. Most importantly, the majority of these 
datasets  do  no  collect  information  on  income,  which  is  a  sine  qua  non,  when 
investigating a considerable number of economic effects of immigration.5 
 














1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Years
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (ESYE) 
 
Between 1991 and 2001 the population of Greece increased by almost 7%, 
while the immigrant population - both legal and illegal (undocumented) - more than 
tripled  to  account  for  7.3%  of  the  entire  population  in  2001  (a  total  of  797,091).6 
                                                 
5   For  a  thorough  discussion  of  available  data  sources  on  immigrants  in  Greece  see 
Baldwin-Edwards (2004c) and Kontis et al. (2006). 
6   According to Gropas & Triandafyllidou (2005b) almost 30,000 immigrants reported 
“return to homeland” as their main reason of immigration (12,000 from Albania, 5,000 from 
Georgia, 5,000 from Russia, 2,500 from Turkey, 2,300 from FYROM, 1,000 from Kazakhstan) 
and, thus, this number is a good approximation for immigrants of Greek origin. In addition,   7 
Unfortunately, there are detailed demographic data for only 762,191 of them. Graph 
1 shows the evolution of immigrant population in Greece between 1951 and 2001 
using  data  from  Population  Censuses.  The  small  decline  between  1981  and  1991 
should be attributed to the considerable proportion of undocumented immigrants 
who  did  not  appear  in  the  1991  Census.  Recent  estimates  that  take  into  account 
undocumented immigrants raise the total number of immigrants in the early years of 
the 21st century to more than a million; that is, 9%-10% of the population. (Gropas & 
Trandafyllidou, 2005a and 2005b; Kontis et al., 2006) 
The majority of immigrants came from neighbouring Balkan countries, such 
as Albania and Bulgaria7, probably due to geographical proximity, which shapes the 
pattern of migration, affects the length of stay and the frequency of trips back to the 
country of origin (Cavounidis, 2002a). Table 1 reports the composition of the foreign 
population in Greece according to the 2001 Census.  
A first look at the table reveals that immigrants from Albania account for more 
than half of all immigrants in Greece (57.5%). The second largest group are those 
from Bulgaria (4.6%), followed by immigrants from Georgia (3.0%), Romania (2.9%) 
and Russia (2.3%).8 Amongst the new EU member-states, Cypriots (2.3%) and Poles 
(1.7%) are the biggest groups of immigrants. There is also a considerable proportion 
of immigrants from developed countries, e.g. the UK (1.7%), Germany (1.5%), Italy 
(0.8%), the US (2.4%) and Australia (1.2%), many of whom are likely to be of Greek 
descent.  A  comparison  with  the  data  collected  during  the  first  regularisation 
program (1998) does not reveal important differences regarding the composition of 
the immigrant population (Cavounidis, 2002b). Further, on aggregate, there are more 
male  (54.5%)  than  female  immigrants,  but  the  composition  varies  widely  among 
different  nationalities,  probably  due  to  cultural  differences  (Gropas  & 
Triandafyllidou, 2005a; Hatziprokopiou, 2005; Cavounidis, 2002a and 2002b).  
                                                                                                                                            
approximately 100,000 Greek-Albanians (Vorioepirotes) have been granted Greek citizenship 
and, thus, were not considered foreigners in the 2001 Census. 
7   For a detailed discussion of immigrants’ characteristics with special reference to three 
Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria and Romania) see Cavounidis (2004). The author reviews 
immigrants’ gender, age, marital status, family composition, reasons for coming to Greece 
and, in particular, employment, remittance behaviour and intended length of stay and she 
finds significant differences across the three ethnic groups. 
8   Based on residence permits data, Kontis et al. (2006) report higher percentages of 
Albanians  (63.2%),  Bulgarians  (9.8%),  Romanians  (4.3%)  and  Ukrainians  (3.4%)  among 
immigrants in 2003/4.    8 
Table 1 – Foreign population in Greece (2001 Census) 
  All  % of Total  Females  % of All 
Albania  438,036  57.5%  180,887  41.3% 
Bulgaria  35,104  4.6%  21,216  60.4% 
Georgia  22,875  3.0%  13,036  57.0% 
Romania  21,994  2.9%  9,547  43.4% 
US  18,140  2.4%  9,335  51.5% 
Russia  17,535  2.3%  10,990  62.7% 
Cyprus  17,426  2.3%  9,142  52.5% 
Ukraine  13,616  1.8%  10,274  75.5% 
UK  13,196  1.7%  7,927  60.1% 
Poland  12,831  1.7%  6,955  54.2% 
Germany  11,806  1.5%  7,060  59.8% 
Pakistan  11,130  1.5%  476  4.3% 
Australia  8,767  1.2%  4,662  53.2% 
Turkey  7,881  1.0%  3,883  49.3% 
Armenia  7,742  1.0%  4,127  53.3% 
Egypt  7,448  1.0%  1,775  23.8% 
India  7,216  0.9%  494  6.8% 
Iraq  6,936  0.9%  2,095  30.2% 
Philippines  6,478  0.8%  4,949  76.4% 
Canada  6,049  0.8%  3,126  51.7% 
Italy  5,825  0.8%  3,068  52.7% 
Syria  5,552  0.7%  1,152  20.7% 
Moldova  5,176  0.7%  4,007  77.4% 
Other  53,432  7.0%  26,456  49.5% 
Total  762,191  100.0%  346,639  45.5% 
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, 2001 Census 
 
According to the 2001 Census, the majority of immigrants came to Greece 
looking for a job (58.9% of males and 48.6% of females)9 and this is probably the 
reason that more than 80% are between 15 and 64 years of age; thus, potentially 
economically active individuals. The second most common reason for immigrating to 
                                                 
9   A very different conclusion is drawn by Kontis et al. (2006) who, using 2003/4 data 
from residence, report that 82.5% of immigrants came to Greece to work.   9 
Greece  is  family  reunion10  (approximately  13%)  and  repatriation11  (almost  7%). 
Nevertheless, over a fifth (21.5%) did not specify the reason for immigrating.12 
According  to  the  2001  Census,  nearly  50%  of  immigrants  have  secondary 
education certificates (including technical schools) and 33% either completed or only 
attended some years of primary school. Almost 10% have tertiary education degrees 
– the percentage is higher among females.13 Albanians had the lowest educational 
qualifications,  while  former  Soviet  citizens  had  the  highest  ones.  As  far  as 
occupational characteristics are concerned, over 90% of immigrants are employees, 
while 6.5% appear to be self-employed (2.8% are employers). This is not surprising 
considering the fact that most immigrants do not speak Greek fluently, at least at the 
beginning, which is often a necessary prerequisite for self-employment.14  
According to Robolis (2005), 13.0% of all employees in Greece are immigrants, 
while according to the Labour Force Surveys they have increased their share in the 
labour force from 3.7% in 1998 to almost 7.0% in 2004 (Kontis et al., 2006). Most of the 
jobs performed by immigrants are low-skilled, involving manual work, well below 
their level of education and typical qualifications.15 Almost 25% of immigrants are 
employed in construction, which means that 27.4% of all workers employed in this 
                                                 
10   Cavounidis (2003) argues that female immigrants more often leave their spouse and 
children behind in the country of origin and, therefore, they may prove the main initiators of 
migration for family reunification in the future.. 
11   Of those who reported repatriation as the main reason for immigrating, more than 
15,000 are immigrants from western countries (US, Australia, Canada and Germany), which 
is in line with our speculation concerning immigrants from developed countries. 
12   Another  reason  for  immigrating  is  asylum  seeking.  According  to  Gropas  & 
Triandafyllidou (2005b) the percentage of asylum seekers accepted to Greece rose slightly 
between 1997 and 2001. The absolute numbers are small, though. For example, in 2001 there 
were 5,499 applications (295 granted) compared to 4,376 in 1997 (224 granted). 
13   Data  from  2004/5  HBS  reveal  a  worrying  pattern  since  young  immigrants’ 
percentages  in  upper  secondary  and  tertiary  education  (students)  are  substantially  lower 
(33.0% and 14.5%, respectively, of relevant age groups) than natives’ percentages (Kontis et 
al., 2006). 
14   Furthermore, in many cases it is imperative for a self-employed person to register to a 
professional chamber, in order to get a license to work, which is an additional barrier.  
15   This phenomenon is usually referred to as over-education. Lianos (2003) investigates 
the  extend  of  over-education  in  the  Greek  labour  market  amongst  tertiary  education 
graduates -including immigrants- and concludes that there is indeed over-education and that 
it is twice as common among immigrants than among Greeks (66.1% as opposed to 37.0%). 
Further, he reports that over-education is more frequently observed among Greek males and 
immigrant females. As a solution to the problem, Lianos (2004b) recommends, firstly, policies 
aimed to help immigrants improve their command of Greek language and, secondly, policies 
aimed to limit the list of regulated professions and change the practises of the corresponding 
professional associations.   10 
sector are not Greek. Further, 20% of immigrants are employed in other services, in 
most  cases  domestic  labour  (taking  care  of  children  or  elderly  persons,  house 
cleaning, etc.), which amounts to 75% of total employment in domestic services. On 
the other hand, 17.5% of immigrants are employed in the agricultural sector (11.6% 
of agricultural employment) and a little more than 15% in tourism and trade. 
Apart from immigrant citizens of third countries, there are many foreigners 
who are virtually - but not typically - considered immigrants. Those are immigrants 
of Greek descent who repatriated from former Soviet Republics during the 1990s.16 
According  to  a  special  Census  conducted  by  the  General  Secretariat  of  Emigrant 
Greeks (GSEG), at the beginning of 2000 there were 152,204 immigrants of Greek 
descent  residing  in  Greece,  of  whom  80,000  came  from  Georgia,  31,000  from 
Kazakhstan, 23,000 from Russia and approximately 9,000 from Armenia. The exact 
number of Albanians of Greek descent who were naturalised before 2001 and, thus, 
were not reported as foreigners in either the Census or the GSEG is still not clear. It is 
estimated, though, that almost 100,000 Albanians of Greek descent reside in Greece 
and have a special identification card issued at local police stations. 
 
4. The economic impact of immigration 
The  studies  examining  the  economic  effects  of  immigration  in  Greece  are 
limited in number and depth, at least compared to other European countries and, 
especially, the US. This is primarily due to the aforementioned lack of the necessary 
statistical information, in part emanating from the illegal status of a considerable 
proportion of the immigrants. The experience of several countries shows that the 
arrival  of  large  numbers  of  immigrants  with  a  considerable  proportion  of  illegal 
workers among them in a particular country has serious effects on total production 
(GDP),  the  size  of  the  informal  sector  of  the  economy,  the  wage  rates  of  both 
indigenous  and  immigrant  workers,  the  rate  and  type  of  employment  and 
unemployment of the natives, the distribution of income, the pace of technological 
                                                 
16   See Triandafyllidou & Veikou (2002) for a discussion of laws concerning immigrants 
of Greek descent (Pontic Greeks and Greek Albanians). The authors support the notion of a 
hierarchy of Greekness according to which the immigration policy is formed, so as to treat 
those  immigrants  differently  by  either  offering  them  the  Greek  citizenship  immediately 
(Pontic Greeks) or after a certain period, during which only the right to enter and settle in the 
country was granted (Greek Albanians).   11 
growth, the use of public services and the cost incurred by the state, the amount of 
remittances taken out of the country, the flows of foreign direct investment and, last 
but not least, the social security and health systems. The existing studies show that 
Greece is not an exception to this rule. 
4.1 Level and composition of GDP 
It has been estimated that in the early 1990s, when the share of immigrants in 
the  total  population  was  substantially  lower  than  its  current  level,  the  net 
contribution of immigrants to GDP ranged between 1% (Lianos et al, 1996) and 1.5% 
(Sarris & Zografakis, 1999). Although at first sight these figures seem quite low in 
comparison with the immigrants’ share in the labour force, Lianos (2004b) argues 
that this is not surprising since the wages of immigrants are much lower than those 
of Greeks and, therefore, their contribution to the portion of GDP going to labour 
should  be  less  than  their  share in  the  labour force.  Further,  Chletsos et  al (2005) 
report  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  relationship  between  the  number  of 
immigrants and the growth rate of the local economy and a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the number of immigrants and the product of the 
agricultural sector as a percentage of local GDP.17  
More recently, Kontis et al. (2006) attempt to estimate the economic impact of 
immigrants (both legal and illegal) on GDP using three different approaches based 
on the use of Social Accounting Matrices.18 In these matrices immigrants are treated 
as  an  independent  factor-group  whose  members  participate  in  the  process  of 
production,  get  paid,  distribute  their  value  added  to  households,  which  in  turn 
consume,  save  or  make  transfer  payments  within  the  country  or  abroad.  It  is 
estimated  that  the  contribution  of  immigrants  to  GDP  in  2004  ranges  from  2.3% 
(expenditures side) to 2.8% (income generating side). Between 0.5% and 0.8% of these 
figures is due to the contribution of undocumented immigrants.  
                                                 
17   The latter is attributed to the fact that prefectures, in which agriculture is important, 
produce less than average output per worker, partly because they rely on labour intensive 
techniques. 
18   This approach is similar to the one adopted by Sarris & Zografakis (1999). However, 
in the sample of Kontis et al. (2006) the immigrants accounted for around 10% of the labour 
force and most of them were legal (mid-2000s), whereas in the sample of Sarris & Zografakis 
(1999) only 3.2% of the labour force were immigrants and most of them were illegal (mid-
1990s).   12 
Immigrants, particularly undocumented ones, are usually employed in the 
excessively  large  informal  (shadow)  sector  of  the  Greek  economy,  mainly  in 
temporary jobs and are paid wages lower than those of Greek workers with similar 
qualifications (Lianos et al, 1996; Chletsos & Karasavoglou, 1997; Markova & Sarris, 
1997; Kontis et al., 2006). According to Lianos et al (1996), Kanellopoulos (2005) and 
Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001) the employment of immigrants in the informal sector 
of  the  economy  resulted  in  an  expansion  of  the  underground  economy.  Earlier 
studies  (e.g.  Kanellopoulos  et  al,  1995)  estimate  that  informal  economic  activities 
accounted for more than 30% of GDP in the late 1980s, while between 16% and 20% 
of the labour supplied and employed in Greece was not registered. Hence, it would 
be unfair to claim that the immigrants are mainly responsible for the large share of 
informal economy in Greece, since it existed long before they arrived. According to 
Kanellopoulos (2005), other factors seem to be more influential in maintaining the 
extensive  informal  economy  in  Greece,  such  as  the  high  level  of  social  insurance 
contributions,  the  socially  unfair  distribution  of  public  benefits,  labour  market 
rigidities and the weakness of public administration.  
4.2 Wages and unemployment 
As far as wages are concerned, Lianos et al (1996) using data from a number 
of  Northern  Greece  prefectures  calculated  productivity  (lower  for  immigrants 
according to Table 2) and wages (also lower for immigrants according to Table 3) for 
legal (documented) and illegal (undocumented) immigrants and native workers with 
comparable skills. Immigrants’ wages adjusted for productivity appear to be lower 
than those of Greek workers with similar qualifications. This is probably the most 
important reason why employers seem to prefer immigrants to Greeks, assuming 
they  have  the  choice.  Other  reasons  could  be  the  flexibility  of  immigrants  in 
performing  different  jobs  and  their  higher  degree  of  geographical  mobility  in 
comparison with native workers (Fakiolas, 1999). Lower immigrants’ wages are not 
necessarily  due  to  lower  qualifications.  They  could  be  caused  by  discrimination 
against them in the labour market. Demoussis et al. (2006) investigate the issue and 
conclude that 48% of the wage differential between natives and immigrants is due to 
discrimination, but when occupational segregation is taken into account, it turns out 
that  almost  90%  of  that  component  can  be  attributed  to  between-occupations 
differences. Therefore, the major cause of observed wage differentials seems to be the   13 
asymmetrical  occupational  access  of  natives  and  immigrants  (segregation),  rather 
than their unequal treatment within a given occupation. 
 
Table 2 – Productivity levels of legal and illegal immigrants compared to those  
of similarly skilled Greeks 





Lower by more 
than 40%  Prefecture 
Legal  Illegal  Legal  Illegal  Legal  Illegal  Legal  Illegal 
Thessaloniki  33.3  16.7  66.7  0.0  0.0  50.0  0.0  33.3 
Pella  25.0  33.3  25.0  8.3  41.7  33.3  8.3  25.0 
Imathia  26.3  20.0  52.6  30.0  21.0  45.0  0.0  5.0 
Kilkis  18.8  29.4  37.5  17.6  25.0  29.4  18.8  47.1 
Total  24.5  21.8  43.4  18.2  24.5  34.5  7.5  25.2 
Source: Lianos et al (1996), CIDER Survey Phase I 
 
Perhaps,  the  most  important  question  is  whether  the  influx  of  immigrant 
workers caused wages of Greek workers to fall and, if so, to what extend. Lianos 
(2004b)  argues  that,  although  real  wages  did  not  decline  during  the  1990s,  they 
appear to have increased at a lower rate than in the past. Interestingly, minimum 
nominal wages rose by 1% to 2% yearly, while the increase on average wages was 
higher.  This  result  is  in  line  with  the  findings  of  Sarris  &  Zografakis  (1999)  and 
Kontis et al (2006). A plausible explanation could be that minimum wage workers are 
unskilled, perhaps with limited work experience, and, consequently, they are the 
ones  competing  with  immigrants.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  wages  of 
unskilled and medium-skilled Greek workers are likely to have been compressed by  
 





Payments in kind 
  Daily  Monthly  Daily  Monthly  Daily  Monthly 
Perm. skilled Greek workers  5.0  153.0  1.8  52.0  -  10.0 
Perm. unskilled Greek workers  4.3  112.3  1.5  -  1.0  - 
Legal skilled immigrants  4.6  137.5  1.2  30.0  1.5  45.0 
Legal unskilled immigrants  -  109.5  -  -  2.0  62.5 
Illegal skilled immigrants  2.5  99.2  -  -  1.5  40.0 
Illegal unskilled immigrants  3.5  125.0  -  -  1.1  45.0 
Source: Lianos et al (1996), CIDER Survey Phase I 
   14 
the presence of immigrants.19 
Ceteris paribus, lower wages led to lower production cost and, thus, weak 
inflationary pressures at a time when Greece was struggling to enter the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). Some authors go even further and accuse the Greek state of 
deliberately sustaining the illegal status of immigrants, in order to benefit from them 
in the above way. Baldwin-Edwards (2004b) goes as far as claiming that, while Greek 
citizens wanted the legalisation of immigrants, the Greek state preferred them to be 
in an illegal or semi-legal status and, thus, be easily controlled and manipulated or 
even deported, if necessary. In this framework, Lazaridis & Poyago-Theotoky (1999) 
developed a simple game-theoretic model in order to determine the optimal policy 
for the government with respect to the regularisation of undocumented immigrants. 
The optimal strategy of the government appears to depend on the relative magnitude 
of employer and government payoffs as well as the size of the fine in case of being 
caught breaking the law. 
Another very important question is related to the impact of immigrants on 
the rate of unemployment of the native workers. Two conflicting views can be found 
in  the  literature.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  foreign  and  local  labourers  are  substitutes 
(“substitution hypothesis”), then, since the former are much cheaper to employ than 
the  latter,  they  would  be  preferred  to  them  and,  thereupon,  lead  to  increased 
unemployment  of  the  natives.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  foreign  workers  are 
complementary  to  the  natives  (“segregation  hypothesis”),  then  their  increased 
employment might lead to increased employment of the natives too. The latter is in 
accordance with the view that immigrants are employed in jobs the natives are not 
interested in. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  idea  that  immigrants  replace  natives  and,  thus, 
increase unemployment among the latter is widely spread among the general public, 
Fakiolas & King (1996), Iosifidis & King (1998) and Fakiolas (1999) argue that this is 
not  the  case  for  Greece,  since  immigrants  are  usually  employed  in  jobs  that  the 
natives  turn  down.  Likewise,  Hatziprokopiou  (2005)  argues  that  immigrants  are 
typically  employed  in  manual  jobs  in  the  construction  or  manufacturing  sector 
(including small workshops) or jobs at the bottom-end of the service sector ladder 
                                                 
19   Further,  Kontis  et  al.  (2006)  point  out  that  the  arrival  of  new  immigrants  most 
probably has  negative effects on the wages of old immigrants, since these two groups of 
workers are likely to be close substitutes.   15 
(e.g.  retail  trade,  cafes  and  restaurants,  domestic  services),  which  are  physically 
demanding and unskilled employees are preferred. In addition, based on a survey 
conducted by him, he finds that small and medium size firms, in most cases family 
owned,  as  well  as  individuals  or  households  are  the  potential  employers  of 
immigrants. 
Using  more  elaborate  techniques,  Lianos  et  al  (1996)  estimate  that 
immigrants, both legal and undocumented, substitute for Greek workers (0.5% and 
5.8%  respectively),  particularly  in  the  unskilled  labour  market,  especially  in 
agriculture and construction where immigrants are a significant percentage of the 
employed workforce. Nevertheless, they also argue that Greek workers would not 
have performed many such jobs at all, especially in agriculture and construction. 
Sarris  &  Zografakis  (1999)  also  report,  that  about  one  third  of  undocumented 
immigrant workers are net displacement of the Greeks, while the rest of them are net 
addition. The displacement occurs, because immigrants increase the labour supply of 
the  unskilled  and  compress  real  wages,  which  fall  just  enough  to  drive  native 
workers  out  of  the  labour  force.  Furthermore,  they  argue  that  due  to 
complementarities, the influx of immigrants is associated with increases in the real 
wages of skilled labour and, along with it, increases in total supply and employment 
of skilled labour.  
According to Cavounidis (1998) there is a shift from family labour to wage 
labour  due  to  immigrants,  because  activities  previously  performed  by  family 
members, mainly in the agricultural sector, small firms and domestic services, are 
now performed by hired immigrants. It is not clear, though, whether the natives that 
were substituted by foreigners found other jobs or dropped out of the labour market. 
Cavounidis (2006) re-examines the phenomenon and confirms its occurrence, while 
she argues that the structure of employment in Greece (large share of self-employed 
and family workers compared to other European countries) converges to European 
standards due to immigrants. She reports that in 1986 only 49.3% of those working 
where paid employees, while the percentage rose to 63.4% in 2004. A substantial 
proportion of the decline is attributed to the decline in the share of the self-employed 
in the agricultural sector. The change of family division of labour on and off the farm 
due to immigrants is also confirmed by Kassimis (2005), who studies the impact of 
immigrant labour in the agricultural sector in three rural regions in Greece (Ioannina,   16 
Corinthia  and  Chania).  Further,  Labrianidis  &  Lyberaki  (2001),  using  a  survey 
carried out by them in Thessaloniki, support the view that more jobs for the natives 
are created than destroyed by immigrants; thus the two types of labour force are 
primarily complementary.  
Lianos (2003) using data from Labour Force Surveys and the Organisation of 
Labour Force Employment (OAED) reports considerable differences between natives 
and immigrants in their employment characteristics. During the period 1998-2001 the 
rate of employment for Greek males declined by 3.6%, while it rose for Greek females 
by 1.3% and all immigrants (by 16.9% for males and 8.1% for females). In addition, 
the employment rate is higher for immigrants (86% compared to 60% for males and 
55% compared to 37% for females). The same is true for the unemployment rate 
(7.7% vs. 6.7% for males and 17.4% vs.15.3% for females); a finding confirmed by 
Chletsos  et  al  (2005).  Further,  using  both  OLS  and  simultaneous  equations 
techniques, Lianos (2003) concludes that the presence of immigrants affects neither 
the participation nor the unemployment rate of male native workers. In contrast, it 
seems  that  the  female  employment  rate  is  positively  affected  by  the  number  of 
immigrants. One explanation suggested is that the influx of immigrants caused the 
demand for goods and services to rise, which led to a subsequent increase in the 
derived demand for labour in Greek firms. The fact that the majority of Greek firms 
are  small  and  medium  sized  and  mainly  family  owned  coupled  with  the  low 
participation rates of females resulted in women being hired instead of immigrants 
on account of their alleged willingness to work part-time, full-time or periodically, 
without the legal and administrative problems of hiring, firing and paying social 
security contributions. An alternative explanation may be supply-driven and related 
to the increased willingness of females to participate in the labour market due to the 
existence of cheap immigrant labour for domestic services. Either way, as Lianos 
(2004b)  puts  it,  it  could  be  concluded  that  immigration  did  not  contribute  to 
increased unemployment in Greece, but led some women to enter the labour market 
and caused a shift from family to wage labour in certain sectors of economic activity.  
The economic impact of immigrants with special reference to the agricultural 
sector is examined by Chletsos et al (2005) using data from two population surveys 
(1991 and 2001) and a number of Labour Force Surveys (quarterly data from 1998 to 
2003). Their results suggest that, on average, immigrants prefer urban centres (where   17 
they are employed in construction and domestic services) to the countryside and 
they  seem  to  choose  their  place  of  residence  based  on  the  prefecture’s  GDP  and 
unemployment rate. Interestingly, the unemployment rate of immigrants is directly 
and  positively  related  to  the  unemployment  rate  of  the  locals,  which  implies 
complementary labour forces. More importantly, they conclude that there is neither 
substitution of Greeks by immigrant workers in the agricultural sector nor is there a 
significant  impact  of  immigrants  on  agricultural  production.  On  the  other  hand, 
immigrants  seem  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  output  of  the  tertiary  sector, 
probably because women immigrants are widely employed in domestic services.  
4.3 Distribution of income 
Directly related to the effects of immigration on unemployment, employment 
and wage  rates  is  their  impact  on the  distribution  of  income. As noted  above, if 
immigrants compete with unskilled and medium-skilled native workers, they may 
end up compressing their wages. On the other hand, if immigrants are considered 
complementary  to  skilled  workers  and  capital  (mostly  in  small  firms),  they  may 
contribute to the increase in their returns. According to Fakiolas (1999) and Glytsos 
(2005)  this  is  one  of  the  positive  effects  of  immigrants,  since  they  have  helped 
widening what they consider to be an artificially narrow wage differential between 
unskilled  and  skilled  labour  -maintained  since  the  late  1970s  by  trade  union 
pressures and minimum wage legislation- and, therefore, they have contributed to 
higher economic efficiency. Thus, they conclude that immigration is likely to have 
led to increases in income inequality in general and earnings inequality in particular.  
The only relevant detailed empirical study in the field is Sarris & Zografakis 
(1999)  who  use  a  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  model  of  the  Greek 
economy,  calibrated  to a  1998  Social Accounting  Matrix  (SAM).  There are  fifteen 
classes of households distinguished by skill level or function of the household head 
and  by  income-expenditure  level.  Table  4  presents  the  most  important  of  their 
results.  They conclude that the influx of immigrants, although macro-economically 
beneficial,  has  adverse  distributional  effects  when  flexible  wage  adjustment  is 
assumed  in  various  labour  markets.  Households  in  the  urban  sector  headed  by 
unskilled  workers  are  severely  hurt  by  the  inflow  of  immigrants,  especially  the 
undocumented ones, and among those especially the households that are initially 
either poor or middle income. It is interesting to note that all agricultural households,   18 
irrespective  of  income  level,  benefit  from  immigration.  In  addition,  households 
headed by skilled workers or economically inactive individuals, such as pensioners, 
also  seem  to  benefit  from  the  presence  of  undocumented  immigrants.  In 
summarising,  it  is  estimated  that  approximately  37%  of  the  population  –  mostly 
living in poor and middle income households headed by unskilled workers - is hurt 
by immigration, while the rest of the population, located mainly around the middle 
and the top of the income distribution benefit from it. If, on the other hand, nominal 
wages  are  assumed  fixed  for  salaried  workers,  then  these  same  households  that 
previously appeared to lose now seem to gain, at least in so far as they manage to 
keep their jobs. Most of these results are confirmed in a more recent study by Kontis 
et al. (2006), who follow the same methodological approach using 2004 as reference 
year and conclude that immigration affects adversely the distribution of income. 
 
Table 4 – Impact of undocumented immigrants on the real disposable income  





Deviation from reference (%) 












All households  8501.6  1.08  1.25  1.01  1.97  1.74  1.28 
               
Poor  764.8  -2.60  -0.13  0.25  0.80  -0.08  4.97 
Middle income  6167.1  0.72  0.89  0.63  1.40  1.22  0.77 
Rich   1569.6  4.30  3.33  2.85  4.80  4.66  1.52 
               
Agricultural  980.1  1.74  2.41  2.31  4.19  3.55  4.47 
Urban  4882.6  0.23  0.57  0.10  0.94  0.75  0.51 
Unskilled  2369.5  -5.78  -3.89  -2.05  -5.44  -5.54  0.55 
Semi-skilled  1345.5  6.05  4.72  2.29  6.82  6.62  0.43 
Skilled  1167.6  5.74  4.85  1.94  7.11  6.75  0.53 
               
Working  5862.7  0.48  0.88  0.47  1.48  1.22  1.17 
Non-working  2638.8  2.41  2.07  2.20  3.06  2.89  1.53 
Source: Sarris & Zografakis (1999) 
 
4.4 Production and productivity 
As noted earlier, empirical studies show that immigrants in Greece are paid 
less than native workers, they work under difficult and often hazardous conditions   19 
and are mainly employed by small firms – primarily in agriculture and construction - 
and households for domestic services. Immigration is a very important source of 
labour in these sectors. In fact, Fakiolas & King (1996) and Fakiolas (1999) go as far as 
suggesting  that  many  firms  would  have  been  shut  down  -  had  it  not  been  for 
immigrants  -  with  negative  effects  on  employment  and  production.  More  recent 
studies (Fakiolas, 2000; Lyberaki & Pelagidis, 2000; Labrianidis & Lyberaki, 2001) 
broadly agree with the view that immigrants helped small and medium size firms 
survive  and,  in  some  cases,  increase  their  competitiveness  and  profits.  Kassimis 
(2005) focuses on the agricultural sector and argues that immigrants supported both 
the survival and the expansion of farms, although he also concludes that their impact 
was more significant in larger farms. In contrast, Lianos (2004a) notes that this effect, 
although important, may be positive only in the short-run. He argues that in the 
long-run  the  use  of  cheap  immigrant  labour  may  delay  the  adoption  of  new 
technology  and  the  substitution  of  labour  with  capital  in  all  sectors  of  economic 
activity. Thus, in a world where competitiveness and increased productivity require 
the introduction of new technology and methods of production that rely heavily on 
capital, it is possible for a country to fall behind due to its attachment to cheap labour 
and labour intensive production techniques. Undocumented immigrants allow small 
firms  to  survive  and,  therefore,  preserve  an  inefficient  industrial  structure  that 
cannot be sustained within the European Union in the long run. 20 
4.5 Budgetary issues 
Given that Greece’s fiscal condition is characterised by a very large public 
debt  and  continuous  budget  deficits,  it  is  important  to  address  the  issue  of  the 
burden put on public services by immigration. Public services include public schools, 
hospitals, police, administration, transportation etc, the cost of which is directly - 
although  not  proportionally  -  related  to  the  size  of  the  population.  Empirical 
evidence (Lianos et al 1996) suggests, though, that the situation may be different in 
Greece, since the burden put on public services by immigrants is not that significant. 
This is possibly due to the fact that many undocumented immigrants are seasonal 
workers who travel without their families or they are afraid of being located and 
deported and, therefore, do not enrol their children to school or avoid using public 
                                                 
20   The same point is also made in a slightly different context by Labrianidis & Lyberaki 
(2001).   20 
services. The view that immigrants do not overburden the public services in Greece 
is also supported by Tapinos (2000), although he also claims that the corresponding 
burden is not inconsiderable in the case of public education.  Since the data used in 
these studies are rather dated, it is not unlikely that the current situation might be 
different. 
Regarding the use of public health services, the evidence is non clear-cut. 
Immigrants  are  younger  than  natives  and,  hence,  have  lower  needs  for  health 
services. Maratou-Alipranti & Gazon (2005) refer to a pilot survey conducted in a 
general hospital in Athens, which showed that 6.5% of patients were immigrants. 
Health care services are more systematically used by immigrant women compared to 
men, probably due to childbirth and more frequent gynaecological problems, while 
few immigrants provide a certificate of poverty to get free treatment. Likewise, using 
the information of the 2004/5 Household Budget Survey, Kontis et al. (2006) report 
that the percentage of immigrants hospitalised is a little lower than that of natives 
(6.1% vs. 7.5%), while natives tend to spend more days in hospital, probably due the 
different  age  composition  of  the  two  groups. Based  on  data  from  IKA,  Maratou-
Alipranti & Gazon (2005) report that, due to the nature of their (more hazardous) 
occupations, immigrants are more than twice as likely as natives to suffer an accident 
at work and, therefore, to need medical treatment. 
Unlike undocumented immigrants, legally employed ones contribute to social 
security funds and pay taxes, thereupon paying for their share of health care services 
and  social  infrastructure  (e.g.  schools  and  urban  transportation).  Undocumented 
immigrants, on the other hand, are only subject to indirect taxation (value added 
taxes and excise duties). According to Kanellopoulos (2005), though, very few legal 
immigrants  pay  income  tax,  because  of  their  low  income,  while  the  income  of 
undocumented  ones  is  even  lower  than  that  of  legal  immigrants.  Therefore,  he 
concludes  that  only  a  very  small  proportion  of  income  taxes  are  lost  due  to 
undocumented immigrants and, consequently, the most important negative effect on 
public  revenues  is  the  loss  of  social  security  contributions.  Using  a  number  of 
assumptions, Kanellopoulos estimates that this loss amounts to 10% to 20% of the 
contributions paid by legal immigrants. 
While adult immigrants, either legal or undocumented, do not usually attend 
public schools, their children are allowed to and often do. Using data from Labour   21 
Force Surveys, Kanellopoulos (2005) estimates that over 95% of immigrants’ children 
attend public schools or, put differently, foreign students amount to 1% of Greek 
students. Should a constant per pupil education cost is assumed, then the author 
concludes that 1% of educational public expenses in Greece could be attributed to 
immigrants’ children. It is likely that in recent years this percentage has risen as 
increasing numbers of immigrants bring their families to Greece. 
Perhaps the most important burden put on public services by immigrants is 
associated to public order. For example, according to Kanellopoulos (2005) there are 
58 police departments employing 5,000 bushrangers specialising in border control. In 
addition, tracing illegal immigrants is the main duty of a large number of policemen 
stationed in these departments. In order to safeguard the Greek coasts from illegal 
entry of foreigners, the Ministry of Merchant Marine employed in 2003 6,251 persons 
with  4  choppers,  319  terrestrial  vehicles,  approximately  200  picket  boats  and  7 
planes.21 A complete picture of the cost incurred should also include the amount of 
money spent on detention rooms and expulsions. Although the author concludes 
that  there  is  no  statistical  information  available  to  calculate  the  total  cost,  he 
speculates that it should be quite significant. 
A relevant study by Lianos & Benos (2003) estimates the cost of immigrants in 
terms of increased criminal activity, which requires more funds directed towards 
fighting crime. Using data provided by the Greek police (1981-2001 for Greeks and 
1988-2001 for immigrants) they estimate an upper and a lower bound of the cost 
incurred  by  the  Greek  state  by  employing  two  alternative  estimation  methods.22 
According to them, the cost of increased criminal activity by immigrants -including 
police, judicial and penitentiary services- ranges from 77 million euros to 354 million 
euros in 2001 (1995 prices). For the whole period of 1996-2001 the cost estimate is 
between 384 million euros and 1317.6 million euros (1995 prices). In any case, these 
figures are far from trivial. 
                                                 
21   Naturally, these resources are also employed for other purposes but, undoubtedly, 
one of their main uses concerns the safeguarding of the Greek coasts from the entry of illegal 
immigrants. 
22   The upper bound is estimated under the assumption that all additional expenses for 
public order are attributed to immigrants, because the data show an inter-temporal decrease 
in  crimes  committed  by  Greeks.  The  lower  bound  is  calculated  by  attributing  additional 
expenses  for  public  order  to  Greeks  and  immigrants  according  to  their  share  of  crimes 
committed.    22 
4.6 Remittances 
Among  other  things,  the  benefits  from  immigration  of  the  labour  sending 
country  (country  of  origin)  include  the  reduction  of  social  tensions  from 
unemployment and/or underemployment, the acquisitions of skills in the foreign 
countries by the returning migrants and the money transfers from migrants to their 
families back home, i.e. remittances. Markova & Sarris (1997) using data from a small 
sample of Bulgarian immigrants in Athens, report that 80% of them exhibited strong 
remittance behaviour. According to Table 5, approximately 60% of them sent more 
than 50% of their income to their home country, mostly to their parents and their 
children.  
 
Table 5 – Share of earnings remitted by immigrants (%) 
  0-10%  10-20%  20-30%  30-40%  40-50%  >50%  Total 
AGE               
20-30  0  1  3  2  4  6  16 
30-40  0  3  0  1  6  16  26 
40-50  1  2  3  0  3  26  35 
>50  0  0  0  1  0  12  13 
SEX               
Male  0  3  3  2  3  9  20 
Female  1  3  3  2  10  51  70 
TOTAL  1  6  6  4  13  60  90 
Source: Markova & Sarris (1997) 
 
More recent evidence provided by Lianos & Cavounidis (2006) - using survey 
data  collected  from  those  who  had  been  granted  a  green  card  during  the  first 
regularization program – show that immigrants in Greece remit on average around a 
quarter of their income, but the proportion of income remitted differs substantially 
among immigrants from different countries. Albanians tend to remit less compared 
to others (42.4% vs. 66.8%) and a higher percentage of those coming from non ex-
socialist  countries  tend  to  remit  (69.6%  vs.  50.3%  -  Table  6).  Further,  Albanian 
immigrants remit less than 20% of their income, while the average for the rest of the 
immigrants is over 30%.23 There is also a difference between men and women in 
                                                 
23   The low percentage of income remitted in the case of Albanians is probably due to 
the family composition of their migration, since most of them migrate together with their 
spouse and children (Cavounidis, 2003 and 2004).   23 
terms of the amounts remitted. Men remit on average 22% of their income, while the 
corresponding figure for women is 35%. The propensity to remit is not constant and 
seems  to  be  negatively  correlated  with  the  length  of  stay.  For  instance,  there  is 
evidence that those who have lived more than five years in Greece remit 22% of their 
income, while the corresponding figure for those who have lived in the country for 
less than five years is 30%. On the other hand, the elasticity of remitting is less than 
one, which means that the percentage change of remittances is always lower than the 
percentage change of income.  
 








1.   Total  899  475  52.8 
2.   Males  692  335  48.4 
3.   Females  207  140  67.6 
4.   Albanians  516  219  42.4 
5.   Non Albanians  383  256  66.8 
6.   Former Socialist countries  708  356  50.3 
7.   Non socialist   115  80  69.6 
8.   Less than 2 years in Greece  16  8  50.0 
9.   More than 2 years in Greece  861  451  52.4 
10. Less than 5 years in Greece  303  206  68.0 
11. More than 5 years in Greece  596  299  50.2 
Source: Lianos & Cavounidis (2006) 
 
Further, Lianos & Cavounidis (2004) investigate the factors that determine the 
probability to remit and the amount of remittance. They conclude that the decision to 
remit depends on the migrants family situation (number of children, existence of a 
spouse, parents and whether they are in Greece), while the size of the remittances 
depends on the level of income, the total number of children and the number of 
children in Greece. Immigrants from less deprived families are more likely to send 
money home, while those with steady jobs remit less money than those employed in 
less secure jobs. In a recent work, Lianos & Cavounidis (2008) examine the role of 
two  additional  factors  affecting  remittances,  namely  stability  of  employment  and 
relative  deprivation.  They  conclude  that  employment  stability  has  no  significant 
effect on the decision to remit, but those immigrants in steady jobs remit less money.   24 
On the other hand, immigrants coming from less deprived families are more likely to 
send money back home, but the size of those remittances does not depend on their 
family’s economic conditions.24  
Remittances  are  crucial  for  the  receiving  countries,  because  they  raise 
disposable incomes and consumption and provide foreign exchange necessary for 
the import of raw materials and capital goods, which are an imperative prerequisite 
for  economic  development.  On  the  other  hand,  remittances  reduce  disposable 
income and aggregate demand in the host-country. If one takes into consideration 
that  Greece  is  a  member-state  of  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  and, 
thereupon, has adopted euro as its national currency, it is not difficult to realise that 
remittances may never return to Greece via exports, tourism etc. and, thus, they are 
likely  to  constitute  a  net  loss  of  national  income.  This  is  particularly  true  for 
immigrants coming from distant countries like India, Pakistan and Philippines and 
less  so  in  the  case  of  neighbouring  Balkan  countries.  It  is  estimated  that  in  2000 
remittances from immigrants in Greece were approximately 509 million euros, of 
which 219,2 million euros from Albanians alone (Lianos & Cavounidis, 2006), while 
Kanellopoulos  (2005),  based  on  more  recent  data,  reports  that  remittances  from 
Albanians in Greece amount to $400 million per year. 
4.6 Social security  
The arrival of a considerable number of immigrants in a small country in a 
short period of time is likely to affect the demographic structure of the country’s 
population. On average, immigrants are younger than natives and, thus, they have 
contributed to the rejuvenation of the total population. As noted, between 1991 and 
2001  Censuses  the  increase  in  population is  almost  exclusively  due to  immigrant 
flows.  Nevertheless,  Bagavos  and  Papadopoulou  (2002)  argue  that  the  effect  of 
immigration on the demographic structure of the population was not dramatic. For 
example, according to their estimates, the share of persons aged over 65 would have 
been  16.7%  without  the  immigrants  against  15.8%  that  is  the  percentage  after 
immigration. Long-term effects will depend on how many of those immigrants will 
stay permanently in Greece. In any case, the authors also claim that even if current 
                                                 
24   The explanation provided by the authors is that those from more deprived families 
prefer to bring their families to Greece and, thus, save money instead of remitting. Further, 
those without a steady job prefer to remit more in order to account for the probability to stop 
remitting once unemployed.    25 
immigrant flows persist in the future, they will still be insufficient to stop the ageing 
of the population.   
Directly related to the impact of immigration on the demographic structure of 
the country is migration’s impact on the social security system. There are only two 
studies examining the effect of immigrants on the social-insurance system. The first 
is by Maratou-Alipranti & Gazon (2005) who use data from the 2001 Census and the 
2003 Labour Force Survey as well as information provided by the three largest social 
insurance funds, namely the social security institution for wage and salary earners 
(IKA),  the  social  security  organisation  for  self-employed  (OAEE)  and  the  social 
security  organisation  for  farmers  (OGA).  Based  on  available  data,  all  legal 
immigrants pay social security contributions and are, thus, insured. Social security 
benefits  are  similar  for  immigrants  and  natives  but,  due  to  their  lower  incomes, 
immigrants pay lower social security contributions (on average, 2,563 euros annually 
vs. 3,414 euros for Greeks), which - in the long run - will lead to lower pensions. 
Due to limited computerisation, all three social security institutions provided 
insufficient  data.  Nevertheless,  those  provided  by  IKA  allow  for  some  general 
conclusions to be drawn. They suggest that immigrants’ contributions amounted to 
11.0% of all IKA contributions in 2003. Immigrants pay higher contributions as a 
percentage of their earnings (37.8% vs. 43.1% - see Table 7) probably due to higher 
contributions paid by workers in hazardous jobs (as well as to the fact that almost 
none of them are paid wages high enough to reach the social security contributions 
ceiling that is achieved by a fair number of native workers). Maratou-Alipranti & 
Gazon (2005) argue that, from this point of view, the integration of immigrants in the 
labour market is beneficial in the short-run, because they contribute more than their 
Greek counterparts. But, in the long-run, they too will retire and will be entitled to 
pensions. One additional problem will be the low pensions that will be received by 
immigrants  in  20  to  25  years  from  now,  as  a  result  of  low  social  security 
contributions paid today. The state can either hope that strong family networks will 
alleviate the problem of elderly poverty or it could organise today a security scheme 
to aid immigrants with very low pensions. This would be avoided if in the near 
future many immigrants return to their countries of origin. Even in this case, though, 
then  they  will  be  entitled  to  pensions  (unless  they  do  not  have  the  minimum   26 
contribution  record  required),  probably  through  bilateral  agreements  between 
Greece and these countries. 
 
Table 7 – Ratio of social security contributions to wages (%) 
Nationality  Males  Females  Total 
Greeks  37.3  38.8  37.8 
Immigrants  43.5  42.3  43.1 
Albanians  45.1  44.0  44.8 
Total (Greeks and Immigrants)  37.6  39.0  38.2 
Source: Maratou-Alipranti & Gazon (2005) 
 
The second study attempting to investigate the impact of immigrants on the 
social security system in Greece is that of Bagavos & Papadopoulou (2006). They also 
use data from two Labour Force Surveys (1991 and 2001), two Population Censuses 
(1991 and 2001) and micro- data from IKA. According to them, there is an inter-
temporal increase of the labour force in Greece, which is attributed to immigrants 
and women entering the labour market. They argue that the entry of immigrants has 
simply postponed the ageing population problem and that their contributions are 
crucial for the system’s survival. They suggest that immigrants will have no effect on 
the time when the anticipated crisis of IKA will take place (around 2025), because the 
ratio of natives to immigrants is still very high (thus the effect of immigrants is rather 
limited), immigrants appear to work shorter periods than natives (reported working 
time is 20% shorter for immigrants) and they also receive lower daily wages (by 
27%). In addition, Bagavos & Papadopoulou (2006) claim that IKA will be in serious 
trouble  in  the  future,  since  the  balance  between  pensions  and  social  security 
contributions  for  immigrants  (as  well  as  natives)  is  not  sustainable.  The  authors 
sound even more pessimistic when they point out that if there was a convergence 
between immigrants and native workers’ characteristics and wages, the “judgement 
day” for IKA would arrive even sooner, due to the expansion of immigrants’ rights 








Graph 2 – Evolution of reserve funds IKA-ETAM* 
 
Source: Bagavos & Papadopoulou (2006) 
*Average retirement age is 62 years, GDP growth rate is 3% and pension increase according to income 
policy. 
Scenario 1: Total number of insured workers, reported working days, reported immigrants’ wage.  
Scenario 2: No immigrants insured, reported working days, reported wage of Greeks. 
Scenario  3:  Total  number  of  insured  workers,  300  working  days,  equal  wage  for  immigrants  and 
Greeks. 
 
4.7 Foreign direct investment 
As Labrianidis et al (2004) point out, in line with the predictions of standard 
factor  mobility  models,  during  the  1990s  Greece  experienced  two  distinct  trends, 
which are the two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, there were large inflows 
of immigrants mostly from neighbouring Balkan countries and, on the other hand, 
there  were  large  outflows  of  capital  from  Greece  towards  these  countries 
(Petrochilos,  1997,  1999;  Salavrakos,  1997;  Kekic,  2005).  By  implication,  if  labour 
movement was restricted while capital movement was free, immigration would have 
been lower and foreign direct investment higher (and vice versa). 
It is estimated that in the period 1989–2000 a sum in excess of US$ 4 billion 
was invested in these countries by Greek firms, while they also invested significant 
sums in developed countries too, so that the book value of Greek outward FDI in the 
turn of the century exceeded US$ 6 billion (McDonald, 2000). Table 8 shows that by 
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In recent years, this trend accelerated substantially and it is very likely that currently 
the  corresponding  figures  are  considerably  higher,  while  profits  earned  in  these 
countries boost significantly the balance sheets of the parent companies in Greece. 
Although a small number of Greek firms account for the bulk of the invested funds, 
the  number  of  Greek  small  firms  investing  in  the  Balkans  is  very  considerable 
(especially firms located in regions of the country neighbouring Balkan countries). 
 
Table 8 – Greek investments in the FR Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania 
and FYROM, 1999 
Company  Total Investment  Sector 
  USD m.  %   
OTE SA  1,097  45.6  Telecommunications 
3E Hellenic Bottling Company  177  7.3  Beverages 
DELTA SA  62  2.6  Food 
TITAN  46  1.9  Cement 
Eurobank  38  1.6  Banking 
Mitilinaios Holdings  32  1.3  Mining 
Athenian Brewery SA  28  1.2  Brewery 
Intracom Group  26  1.1  Telecommunications 
Alpha Credit Bank  21  0.9  Banking 
Chipita SA  15  0.6  Food manufacturing 
Commercial Bank  13  0.5  Banking 
Flourmill Loulis SA  8  0.3  Food manufacturing 
Flourmills Agiou Georgiou  8  0.3  Food manufacturing 
Thrace Papermill  6  0.3  Paper mill 
Veropouloi Bros  6  0.3  Commerce 
Other companies  821  36.0   
Total  2,408  100.0   
Source: Labrianidis et al (2004) 
 
Salavrakos  &  Petrochilos  (2003)  attempt  to  investigate  the  main  factors 
leading to FDI directed from Greece towards the Balkan and Black Sea countries and 
conclude that the most important are lower wages in the host countries and lower 
interest rates in Greece after the participation in EMU, which boosted investment. 
Further,  Stoiana &  Filippaios  (2008)  show  that rule  of law  and high bureaucratic 
quality  are  essential  for  the  Greek  firms’  decision  to  invest  abroad,  while  the 
existence of high levels of corruption acts as a deterrent. What is also interesting is 
that Greek FDI seems to be the result of a strategic business decision, with a long-  29 
term  time  horizon,  and  is  systematically  spread  across  numerous  countries  and 
sectors of economic activity (Bastian, 2004).  
Labrianidis et al (2004) trace the source of this phenomenon as well as the 
employment of immigrants by small firms in Greece on the effort of small Greek 
firms to deal with international competition by relying on labour intensive strategies 
either by using cheap labour supplied by (mainly Balkan) immigrants in Greece, or 
by  exploiting  lower  labour  cost  available  in  the  same  Balkan  countries,  thus  by 
investing  abroad.  They  are  quite  ambivalent  regarding  the  final  outcome  of  this 
strategy in the sense that these inter-related phenomena can prove either a blessing 
or a Pandora’s Box for the economies and societies of the countries involved. The 
outcome  is  likely  to  depend  on  social  and  political  factors;  for  example  on  their 
success in building multicultural societies tolerant of differences and on developing 
attitudes conducive to open economies.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Greece has experienced a sharp rise in immigration since the early 1990s as a 
result  of  social,  economic  and  political  changes  in  former  communist  countries 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first immigrants came from Poland, 
but many others followed them; they were mostly illegal and were mainly looking 
for a job. The key feature in Greece’s experience, though, that made Greece different 
from other south European countries was the dominance of immigrants from a single 
country, namely Albania. Greece needed a cheap labour force in order to contain 
costs and price increases to accommodate her effort to meet the criteria set in order to 
participate in the European Monetary Union and immigrants, especially the illegal 
ones,  provided  it,  since  they  were  in  no  position  to  negotiate  wages  or  working 
conditions. They would perform any job, as long as it allowed them to stay in the 
country, even with bad living conditions or the fear of getting deported, if arrested. 
Most  immigrant  males  are  employed  in  construction  and  the  agricultural  sector, 
while the majority of women are employed in domestic services. 
Under the increasing number of immigrants, the government attempted to 
introduce a migration policy, which at first was aiming at stopping the immigrants 
from getting into the country. Due to the geographic location of Greece and the fact   30 
that most immigrants were coming from neighbouring Balkan countries, these efforts 
quickly  proved  inadequate.  The  next  step  was  to  try  to  legalise  them.  Three 
legalisation  schemes  were  put  into  practice,  but  bureaucracy  and  public  sector 
rigidities  led  to  unsatisfactory  results.  Some  commentators  go  as  far  as  accusing 
Greece of deliberately creating obstacles, in order to limit the number of immigrants 
getting a legal work and residence permit, and allow their employers to exploit them. 
The bottom line is that the categories of immigrants still remain fuzzy and, because 
of bureaucracy and, especially, lack of administrative will, immigrants continue to 
fall in and out of legal status. 
Although many studies attempt to investigate the impact of immigrants on 
the  Greek  economy,  the  lack  of  truly  reliable  statistical  information  seriously 
constrains  their  results.  Most  of  the  studies,  though,  agree  that  immigrants  have 
positive and negative economic effects. Among the positive effects are mentioned the 
increase  in  the  GDP  growth  rate,  the  revitalisation  of  the  agricultural  sector  and 
many small and medium enterprises, at least in the short-run and the dampening of 
inflationary pressures. On the negative side, immigrants are thought to have helped 
the  expansion  of  the  already  large  informal  economy,  in  some  cases  they  have 
substituted Greek unskilled and semi-skilled workers (although according to others, 
they have freed up the labour force, leading to a better division of labour and higher 
product  per  worker)  leading  to  increased  income  inequality,  unemployment  and 
slow  growing  wages,  especially  for  those with  low  skills,  and  contributed  to  the 
slowing down of technological developments since firms found it easier to hire cheap 
labour than to invest in capital intensive production techniques. In some other issues, 
such  as  the  impact  of  immigrants  on  overall  employment  and  unemployment,  a 
definite answer is not clear. Public services do not seem to have been overburdened 
by the presence of immigrants, with the exception of services related to public order. 
Due to their low incomes, immigrants pay very little direct taxes, whereas the impact 
of immigrants on the social security system is considered positive in the short-run, 
but it is expected to become negative in the long-run.  
Undoubtedly,  Greece  needs  to  find  ways  to  incorporate  immigrants  both 
socially and economically. A more straightforward and clear-cut immigration policy 
is a sine qua non, in order to simplify and rationalise the process of legalisation for 
the  different  groups  of  immigrants.  More  attention  needs  to  be  paid  to  the   31 
immigrants’ needs as well as their social, political, religious and human rights. It is 
also both necessary and important to collect appropriate statistical data that will help 
researchers get a clearer picture of the situation that will allow better informed and 
more  efficient  policies  to  be  planned  and  implemented  by  the  government  and 
NGOs. Last but not least, attention should be paid and efforts should be made in 
order to accommodate the integration of second generation immigrants, an issue not 
yet fully comprehended by the majority of researchers and politicians (Cavounidis, 
2006).   32 
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